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Hauber: Invited Address: Scientists and the Public

Scientists and the Public*
By u. A. HAUBERt
INTRODUCTION

During the past few years our scientific periodicals have been
featuring articles on the social responsibility of scientists. The retiring president of the American Association for the Advancement
of Science in his presidential address last December at Atlanta
chose for his topic Science and People ( 1) rather than a technical
subject. And a year before that E. D. Adrian in his presidential
address to the British Association stated that:
The Association must show the layman where the scientific
age is leading him. It is by its impact on public opinion that the
success of these meetings must be judged. (2)
The trend toward emphasis on the relationship that exists, or
should exist, between scientists and the general public is coming
to a head, thanks, in part at least, to the threat of the H-bomb.
It is of interest to note that as far back as 1912, two years before
the first World War, a prominent scientist made this statement:
The scientist . . has his dreams about the future. He dreams
of the time when the engines of destruction will be so powerful
and certain in action that war will be impossible, and the world
shall become one great community of enlightened, intelligent
human beings dwelling in peace and unity. (3)
Commenting on this statement Ilse Bry and Janet Loe write:
By the middle of the century, scientists believed that the engines of destruction had become powerful enough and sufficiently certain in action to annihilate life on earth; but they were
not so sure that this means fulfillment of the rest of the dream.
( 4)
There is now a clear realization of the fact that scientific progress
alone will not make this a better world to live in; something more
is needed. With this need in mind, a group of scientists met at
Haverford College in Pennsylvania in September, 1949, to form
a "Society for Social Responsibility in Science." ( 5) In the summer
of 1950 Albert Einstein in a letter to the Society wrote:
In our time scientists and engineers carry particular moral
responsibility, because the development of military means of
mass destruction is within their sphere of activity. ( 6)
To live up to this social and moral reponsibility will not be easy.
One difficulty is pointed out by Prof. I. Rabi of Columbia Univer*An essay on Science and Religion prepared in connection with the
Presidential Address to the Iowa Academy of Science delivered at Grinnell
Iowa. April 20. 1956.
'

tFather Hauber passed away July 1, 1956.
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sity in a recent address at Harvard. He called for "greater understanding between scientists and humanists to combat a growing
mood of anti-intellectualism," and he says:
The non-scientist cannot listen to the scientist with pleasure
and understanding .. science seems to be no longer communicable to the great majority of educated laymen .. To his colleagues in the university the scientist tends to seem more and
more as a man from another planet, a creature uttering profound but incomprehensible truths. ( 7)
Another difficulty that must be faced is expressed by Bertalanffy
in the sentence: "The basic symptom of present society seems to
be the uprise of the masses or the proletariate." ( 8) The behavior
of these "masses," he thinks, is determined not by any process of
reasoning; it is the modern types of propaganda broadcast to everyone by methods of mass communication that determine how they
think and act. Their behavior is the result of more or less blind
conditioned reflexes developed under the influence of radio and
television.
Science has become so important in our times that the very
survival of mankind depends on it. In a democracy such as ours,therefore, it is imperative that scientific work receive the spontaneous support of the general public. Somehow a situation has
developed recently in which the public is inclined to be hostile to
the scientists; at least there is a gap between them that should not
exist. What can we, on our part as scientists, do to improve this
unsatisfactory relationship?
(1) We must m:ake every effort to help the lay public understand the value and importance of science by translating its lessons
into popular language. Forty or fifty years ago that was relatively
easy; there still were for example, as I well remember, first rate
scientists at Iowa University, men like MacBride and Nutting in
the field of biology, who could address a non-science group and be
understood by them. Indeed, they were not only understood, they
were applauded. Such men are rare today because of the extreme
specialization demanded of anyone who is to be proficient in his
field. Good . scientists who can explain the significance of their
work in plain English are no longer common. But the thing must
be done.
( 2) We should have in our schools, especially in high schools,
a science teaching program.that will reach the majority of students.
Recent surveys show that we are not as well off in this respect now
as we were a generation ago. In our present educational setup, in
which everybody goes to high school, when all pupils whether bright
or dull attend the same classes, and especially when the student
has a voice in what he is to take, it would seem that we simply
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must make the courses attractive. Whether this is possible without
at the same time making them superficial seems questionable.
Possibly by covering less ground in the high school course and at
the same time giving more talented pupils special assignments, the
problem can be solved.
(3) We must convince the layman, and that means the factory
worker, that fundamental scientific research is important in the
economic life of the nation. Modern science has made it possible
for the average man to enjoy the good things of life which formerly were available only to the wealthy few. Engineering, mathematics, physics and chemistry have made possible our prosperity
which is dependent upon successful methods of mass production.
The biological sciences have enabled. us to pile up a supply of food
in superabundance. And so on. Such facts can· be presented to
the public in a way that partakes of the sensational, even of the
spectacular. The ordinary lay folk will follow the argument if it
is presented to them in the kind of language to which they are
accustomed.
However, before a get-together of scientist and the general public
will produce results, misunderstandings must be removed. Besides
the two factors already mentioned that give rise to such misunderstandings, namely the esoteric nature of science on the one hand,
and the anti-intellectual mood of the public on the other, a third
one may be mentioned. It is this: the ideology or fundamental
outlook on life of many representative scientists, as indicated in
their writings, is quite different from that of large segments of
the general public. While this statement does not hold for all
scientists, it does apply to a majority of those who have gone on
record. It is this phase of our problem that I have attempted to
discuss in some detail in this paper.
VALUES AND FACTS

To introduce our topic we may quote Morris S. Viteles (9) who
sounds a warning by calling attention to the important distinction
between values and facts. He writes for psychologists, but his words
are applicable to all scientists, and if we substitute the word "scientist" for "psychologist," here is what he says:
There is a tendency on the part of the scientist to inject value
judgments in a manner that makes it increasingly difficult,
especially for the layman, to detennine when the scientist is
dealing with facts and principles derived from experiments, or
when he is merely presenting his own value judgments. It has,
in other words, become increasingly difficult to know when the
scientist speaks with the authority of science or when he is
playing the role of social reformer clothed-or even disguisedin the garb of the scientist.
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_In _saying _this _I _am, naturally, not denying the right of the
scientist to his opm10n-to his own value judgments .. It is not
his privilege, however, to clothe the source and personal nature
of such opinions in the language and form of scholarly writing
to the point where it would appear that they are the outcome
of scientific inquiries .. There is no better time than now to recall the forceful appeal of A. V. Hill that "scientists should be
implored to remember that, however accurate their scientific
facts, their moral judgments may conceivably be wrong." ( 10)
, Value judgments vary with one's outlook on life. And it is a
well-.known fact that modern scientists, especially the biologists,
have developed a fundamental philosophy of their own. They have
encouraged an attitude toward the great problems of human existence that tends to irritate the non-scientist, both humanist and
Christian.
To come to grips with this situation it is desirable to state clearly
what these attitudes are and what lies behind them. ·
Two IDEOLOGIES
I. Materialism
Under this heading of materialism we may stress the nineteenth
century theory of determinism and the present-day philosophy of
chance.
The pioneer physicists and chemists of a century ago were so
impressed by th.e rigidity of the physical laws of nature that many
of them yielded to a special form of materialistic metaphysics
known as determinism. In their thinking there could be no exception to the laws of physical causation. If, they argued, some superintellect could know the exact location and motion of every material
particle in the universe at the present moment, then that intellect
could accurately predict all future events. Human activities were
not considered an exception, and free will, that is to say, human
responsibility, was called a myth because it could not be fitted into
the material scheme of things. ( 11)
This philosophy was popularized by men like Ernst Haeckel in
Germany at the turn of the century ( 12) . It was not so much the
new science as this· type of revolutionary value judgments preached by militant scientists, that initiated the Warfare Between Science and Theology (13); and it has always been my conviction
that this outlook on life seeped down into the minds of the common people and prepared the way for a Nazi mentality a generation or two .later.
Strange as it must seem to some scientists today, in the nineteenth century chance happenings were considered unthinkable.
In the twentieth century, however, the pendulum of materialistic
philosophy has swung from the former extreme of absolute determinism to the' opposite pole which denies casuality altogether.
THE
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The emphasis now is on chance as a "cause" of the phenomena of
nature. It is frequently argued, for instance, that life developed on
our earth by accident, so to speak. In the languag~ of George Wald
( 14) the origin of life is a chance event, one "highly improbable"
but one that need happen only once in a billion years and is
therefore, somehow, "inevitable."
Such background philosophies as these belong in the domain of
metaphysics rather than in that of the natural sciences. And, more
to the point here, they constitute an ideology that is quite contrary
to Christian thinking. Some of our best scientists are very outspoken
in their support of this "new thought"-which incidentally was
common in ancient Greece; they insist that this is the only rational
philosophy and that it must eventually replace all religions as we
now know them.
II. The Christian Philosophy of Life
The Christian outlook on life is opposed to any form of materialism. It is based on the conviction that there is design and purpose
in nature, and that back of the design and purpose there is Almighty God. It stresses the dignity, the value and importance of
the individual human being; man is not wholly a victim of circumstances determined by heredity and environment, he has the power
of free choice and is therefore responsible for his conduct. And
finally, a fundamental tenet of Christianity is faith in a personal
immortality after death.
It is true, indeed that the public with which the scientist must
live and cooperate is composed of individuals with a variety of
attitudes toward the meaning of life. Perhaps only a bare majority
of Europeans and Americans are actively affiliated with any church
organization; but a large section of the others subscribe, in theory
at least, to some or all the principles of a Christian outlook on life
as here stated. Belief in God is so natural to human thinking that
the common man takes it for granted.
Scientists, like all men, have a right to elaborate and give expression to their own metaphysics and their own religion or lack
of it. But before they broadcast such matters they will do well to
reflect ( 1) that they are no longer dealing with scientific facts
and theories, and (2) that the materialistic outlook on life so common among them is an attack on principles and ideals for which
men will fight and die. The Christian way of life is one in defense of which there have been innumerable martyrs. I feel that
much of the hostility between scientists and the general public is
on this level where men feel as well as think. As long as a considerable number of our top scientists continue to preach a gospel
that is diametrically opposed to the gospel of Christianity there
will be war, cold or hot, between scientists and the general public.
I propose, therefore, to discuss this situation as one of the sev-
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eral reasons for the growing conflict. In doing so, of course, it will
be necessary to refer to my own philosophy of science, and I shall
endeavor to give some reasons for the faith that is in me; but I
definitely have no intention of dictating to others what ideology
they should adopt.
The problem is complicated because the different outlook on life
is not only between scientists and the lay public, but between individuals and groups of scientists among themselves. This last fact is
strikingly exemplified in two very recent books which will be cited
in the course of this paper ( 26,40).
Moreover, while the difference between the two ideologies is
deep-seated, much of the antagonism could be avoided if people
understood one another. Because they are careless with their semantics it often happens that men argue with some heat about details
that, properly understood, have little if any bearing on fundamental principles. If misunderstandings were removed there would be
no argument.
MISUNDERSTANDINGS

We may take as an example two theories on the origin of life that
are commonly considered irreconcilable: the spontaneous generation
of life and the creation of life by God. Oparin ( 15) has
a book on this subject which from the scientific point of view is
highly significant and worth while. In the main he confines his
discussion to an account of "Life's coming into being" (see introduction to the second edition of the translation), an account
which is a detailed description of the hypothetical chemical transformations that preceded the arrival of living things on our earth.
His book is on a scientific level throughout and rarely touches on
metaphysics. When it does, as when for instance he refers to the
"dogma enunciated by St. Augustine of God's will, which arbitrarily
interrupts the usual order of things" (page 11) he is misinformed.
Among early theologians Augustine is the one who emphatically
does not accept an arbitrary interruption of the laws of nature.
In his philosophy God created the "seeds" so to speak, of a material
world; and the present inhabitants of this world are a natural
development of the potencies put there in the beginning. God does
not, according to him, interfere in the unfolding of these potencies.
Oparin, however, does take for granted that a scientist must
adopt a "consistent materialistic philosophy" (page 33) . This is a
statement that neglects the principle of semantics and therefore
gives rise to misunderstandings. If he means that a scientist who
investigates nature must confine himself to the study of its material
aspects he is quite right. But the layman, misled by the word
philosophy, does not distinguish between the material aspects of
nature and its total essence; in fact, Oparin himself does not call attention to any such distinction, and therefore leaves himself open
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to the charge that he is materialistic in his philosophy-especially
since he uses the word-as well as in his science.
In an excellent article under the same heading, "The Origin of
Life" George Wald of Harvard declares that:
The reasonable view is to believe in spontaneous generation;
the only alternative, to believe in a single, primary act of creation.
There is no third position ( 14).
Interpreted in the context of a scientific discussion there can
hardly be any objection to this statement; but taken by itself, and
as interpreted by the general public, it is ambiguous, easily misinterpreted, and needs to be clarified. From the broad human outlook the two views arc not mutually exclusive, rather they may
be complementary. One may hold with Augustine that a single
act of creation of matter and its potencies was necessary before
there could be any spontaneous generation.
At the present time it may still be an open question whether or
not inorganic matter has among its properties the potency of becoming organized into protoplasm without external intervention, that
if, without the addition of some non-material entity. But it is a
problem that will be solved, if at all, by the scientist, not by the
philosopher or religious thinker.
PRIMARY AND SECONDARY CAUSES

To help clarify our thinking in this matter we may recall the
old distinction between primary and secondary causes, a distinction
stressed by the ancient Greeks, the medieval scholastics and by the
18th century William Paley. These thinkers all agree that back of
nature, which is to be looked upon as a secondary cause of material phenomena, one must look for Nature's God who is the primary
cause.
Perhaps Paley stressed the idea until it became boring to the
general reader. Moreover, he was misleading when he left the
impression that divine intervention occurs in natural phenomena;
since his time, 150 years ago, we have learned that nature takes
care of itself, that the scientist, as a scientist, gets along very well
without bringing Goel in the picture. As I see it Paley overemphasized the obvious while today we tend to reject the obvious.
In order to give a modem twist to an age-old mode of reasoning,
let us consider one of our present-clay automatic machines. An
engineer designed it so that it is self-regulatory-push a button
and raw material is transformed into· a complex finished product.
If the analogy drawn from this example savors of naive anthropomorphism, if it implies the habit of assigning human attributes
to Deity, one can only say that, while it is admittedly figurative
and hopelessly inadequate, it is still nearer reality than the anemic
abstractions of some of our modern philosophers.
We ask the question: Who made the finish eel product emerging
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from the machine? Was it the engineer or the machine itself? The
answer is obviously, both; the idea came first and its execution
followed. The designer of the machine is the primary cause and the
machine is a secondary cause. If the question is asked: Does the
machine have within itself the power of doing this job, the answer
is definitely, yes, that is the way it was made, that is its nature.
This is a form of reasoning as old as the hills and even more
substantial. It tells in figurative language that one may ascribe the
creation of life to God as a primary cause inasmuch as he is the
inventor and builder of a "creative machine" known as nature;
nature then acts as a secondary cause.
The only alternative to this thesis is to ·call Blind Chance and
Natural Selection primary causes.
One may at this point call the attention of theologians, cautiously
of course, to the fact that modem science has helped to clarify
our thinking on the relation that exists between God and the material
universe. Sound Christian theology, indeed, that of men like Augustine and Aquinas, clearly recognizes the principle that Goel works
through natural causes, not by interfering with them. But lesser
men have not always been as clearsighted; modern science is giving
them food for thought.
In keeping with this concept no one should ask the scientist to
refer to Almighty God in his studies and experiments. If, for example, the answer to the question: How did life originate? is
simply: God made it, then there is no need for scientists at all. As
Sir Arthur Thomsen puts it:
To be content with the religious answer-always apt to become
a soft pillow to the easy going-is to abandon the scientific
problem as insoluble, and there can be no greater impiety than
that. It is surrendering our birthright-not for a mess of pottage; it is true, but for peace of mind. Therefore man is true
to himself when he presses home the question: How has this
marvellous system of Animate Nature come to be as it is?
(16, p. 123)
There are in nature secondary causes that operate to produce
life in general and each existing thing in particular. It is one of
the assignments of the investigator to trace the details of these natural causes. The religious thinker, as such, is not interested in the
details of a machine, but he may not question one's right to ex·
plore them.
With these reservations, then, one may accept Oparin's and
Wald's ideas about the role of chance in the origin of life. In the
creation of the machinery which we have called nature, provision
was made for chance events. that would be constructive. Wald
himself time and again admits that this provision exists in the nature
of matter when he uses such phrases as: "a spontaneous impulse
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toward structure formation," "given the right molecules," "the
molecules realign with regard to one another." (pp. 50, 51)
Whether we look upon this "Fitness of the Environment" (17)
as something that is primary and irreducible, ·as the materialists
must do; or whether we call it the product of an Infinite Mind, as
the Christian does, matters not at all for purposes of scientific
study, but is all important from the viewpoint of our outlook on the
meaning and purpose of the life we are here to live.
All this should make it clear that one can believe in both the
creation of life and also in the spontaneous generation of life.

***

Another example of how misunderstandings arise may be taken
from the difference between the narrowed down scientific approach
and the broad philosophic and religious approach to the problem
of just what is the conscious human mind, conscious thought. The
following quotation may serve as an example:
The real material universe exists and is a basic reality. Human
life and thought are a part of it and emerge from it. Thought is
the result of the activity of an organized part of the material
world, and the brain is a reflection of, and in interaction with,
this material universe (18).
Again it is clear that from the scientific point of view such a
statement is admissible. Modern science starts with the material
universe and goes on from there. Human life is a part of this universe, and human thought is inseparably linked with it; it emerges
when, and only when, the proper material basis is there. The
scientist takes this material foundation for granted. As a scientist
he is not investigating its ultimate origin.
Unfortunately it happens too often that the type of thinking
done by the specialist in the pursuit of his life work colors all his
thinking as a man, with the result that he ends by being a materialist or at least an agnostic in his fundamental outlook on life as well
as in his scientific investigations. For him there is no longer any
reality beyond the material universe. That conscious life, human
thoughts, may be immaterial seems altogether impossible to him.
The religious minded individual, on the other hand, who wants
to know the purpose of things, is also inclined to become narrow
in his outlook because he seeks ultimate solutions of the big problems in the concrete happenings of the material world. He tends
to invade the field of the scientist, a field for which he has no
competency.
THE CLASH

OF

THE Two IDEOLOGIES

From this discussion of what may be called semantic carelessness
it soon becomes clear that ordinarily the real disagreements are far
more deep-seated; they are not at all due to misunderstandings of
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details, but flow directly from the fundamentally opposed ideologies
that we have defined.
A concrete illustration of the struggle that exists between the
opposite world-views is provided by the question of a distressed
college student who comes to his advisor with the query:
I am at the end of my rope. I have now lost my faith in science,
and I gave up religion long ago. What am I to do? (19)
At present the hostility between the two camps is quite general.
, It is true that the ordinary run-of-the-mill scientific workers avoid
the issue; but many, perhaps a majority, of our outstanding biologists have gone on record in favor of a strictly materialistic philosophy of life; and the science major in college is indoctrinated with
this philosophy and its anti-religious implications. In practice, of
course, no one lives such a philosophy; no one can. But in theory
it is defended and, what is more to the point here, it is claimed
that science demands such a philosophy.
One cannot dictate to any man, scientist or otherwise, what he
should or should not subscribe to as a fundamental outlook on life.
What can and should be done is to point out the consequences,
from the viewpoint of public relations, of having scientists place
before the public their own value judgments as necessarily implied
by scientific findings.
In reference to the problem suggested by the question of the college student, the Conferences on Religion in the Age of Science
held in 1954 and 1955 at Star Island, New Hampshire (20, 21)
have done constructive work that holds promise for the future. It
is also of interest to note here that specialists in the physical sciences,
men like Millikan, Eddington, Planck and a host of others, tend
to be less, materialistic in their world views than the biologists.
Their attitude was expressed by William James when he said:
"Our science is a drop, our ignorance a sea." (22, p. 56)
ScrnNTISM

It is quite natural for workers in some one field to be so blinded
by the brilliance of truths revealed to them in their specialty that
they no longer appreciate values in other fields. Scientists tend to
be affected in this way. For many of them not only their science, but
their philosophy and religion too, are ·all based solely on the conclusions of scientific investigations.
This way of thinking has been called scientism, an ism that may
be defined as an attitude which assumes that all problems that face
mankind-social, philosophical, religious and moral--can be solved
by an application of the scientific method developed in modern
times. And biologism assumes that human conduct can be fully explained and expressed in biological terms, that any information
obtained from other surces is worthless.
Not all scientists, of course, or even a majority of them tend to-
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ward philosophical scientism; and many of them that do, admit
that in this matter they speak for themselves alone. However, as
stated above, the public does not distinguish between the scientist's
science and his value judgments.
In this paper I quote a number of first rate scientists who have
put their value judgments on record and will not object to being
referred to publicly by one who disagrees with their ideology. They
may not agree that their utterances are harmful to good public
relations, but that is a matter on which opinions differ and a free
discussion is in order.
We may begin with A. J. Carlson who has an enviable record
as a scientist, is highly respected by those who through the years
have been his students, and who is still active. His 1931 presidential
address before the American Association for the Advancement of
Science was entitled: Science and the Supernatural. Its author calls
it "The confession of a physiologist of lack of faith in the supernatural." The address was so popular among scientists that it was reprinted in the Scientific Monthly in 1944 ( 23, 24) . Surely this
official address to his fellow scientists by the chosen leader of American scientists will be taken by the public as representative of science
in general. He admits, indeed, that:
On the topic before us (Science and the Supernatural) it is
preposterous for any man to speak for science as a whole and,
by inference, for all scientists (23).
but that admission does not change the impression that the public
carries away from this address, namely that here we have the voice
of science. His anti-religious bias is today as vigorous as ever. He
recently made the following unqualified statement:
The meaningful and enduring warfare is now between a genuinely modern society . . and the organized religions ( 25) .
Oscar Riddle in his latest book (26) condemns all organized
religions after "a cursory look at the good and harm done by them"
( p. xix) and refers to a fellow scientist, Henry Fairfield Osborn,
who disagrees with him as one of the "self-appointed spokesmen for
science" who "have betrayed it." (pp. 212-213)
The following quotation from H. S. Jennings, a man who was one
of our best and most influential biologists, one whom everybody
loved and admired, needs no commentary:
If then we .arc to foun~ our outlook on the world on what we
discover in the scientific study of life, we are compelled to break
with the notion that personality, individual identity, continues
after death. We are compelled to conclude that the individuals
who have disappeared exist no more than they did before they began life... This I believe to be one of the fundamentals for a
world outlook based on the study of biology. (27, p. 87)
A statement found frequently in texts and scientific articles reads
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something like this by A. Franklin Shull:
The concept of teleology,' the purposefulness of events, has
ever been a bar to scientific progress. (28, p. 6)
The following value judgment is found, of all places, in a text on
biology published by McGraw-Hill in 1954:
In past centuries, much mental energy has been frittered
away on questions like "What is the meaning of life?" or "Why do
we live?" as if the answers lay somewhere out in the universe,
just beyond our reach. Today it is time to recognize that either
such meaing is beyond our reach or there is no external meaning
at all. It is time for man to cast off the prejudices of his ancestors, to rid himself of the shackling illusions of the past .. (29,
p. 649)
An excellent and highly respected scientist, F. B. Sumner, in an
article entitled A Biologist Reflects on Old Age and Death, refers
to the idea of immortality of one's personality after death as absurd. ( 30, p. 148)
William E. Ritter, in a brief paper at a symposium in his honor
held by the members of the Western Society of Naturalists, has
this final paragraph in his address:
To be rid of supernaturalism in every aspect of human life,
not by explicitly rejecting it, but by such development of naturalism that there shall be no longer any need for supernaturalism,
is the great stage of cultural evolution in which the human species
is now struggling ( 31, p. 170) .
S. J. Holmes in his Life and Morals (32) refers to man as an
"animal a bit more advanced than the rest," (p. 10) and he calls
science "the true Messiah." (p. 100)
Andrew D. White's work on A History of the Warf are of Science
with Theology was reprinted last year ( 13), 60 years after its first
appearance. There may be sound academic reasons for such a reprint as it is a study of the history of thought; but if it is meant for
popular consumption I consider it worse than useless. To focus attention on the mistaken judgments and misdirected zeal of many
theologians of a pre-scientific era, whether Catholic or Protestantmistakes that now, in hindsight, seem utterly stupid-will not help
to clear the atmosphere; rather it will tend to put off any reconciliation of science with real religion and sound theology. White himself probably was not a materialist, but his "history" has been
welcomed and will continue to be favored by those who are inclined toward a materialistic philosophy of life.
What we need now is a work similar to White's which will quote
theologians of the present generation. The entire field has changed,
and the change is due, as -the average theologian is now glad to
acknowledge, to the constructive work of the scientists.
As an example of extreme scientism gone wild we may cite one
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of our foremost biologists, H. J. Muller, who writes an article (33)
which is a satisfactory summary from the scientific and technical
point of view, but which also indulges in value judgments and in
wishful thinking that has no basis whatever iq scientific experimentation. For example: "Conscious phenomena are physico-chemical
phenomena." The native intelligence of man is "not very much
greater than that of some other existing animals." "Man as we
know him is to be regarded as only a transitional operative in the
progression of life." The principle objective of the human race is
the "genetic remodelling of our primitive urges, the improvement
of our intellectual ability, and even of our body construction." He
ends by giving expression to his Utopian ideas in these words:
If the mindless gene . . has generated mind and foresight and
then advanced this product from the individual to the social
mind, to what reaches may not we and our heirs, the incarnation
of that social mind, be able, if we will, to carry consciously the
conquests of life?
Such language may be good rhetoric; it is not science. Let us
repeat: a scientist has the right to formulate his own personal value
judgments and to express them; but when he airs such views in
public he is not speaking as a scientist or in the name of science.
It is articles like this that confuse the layman and help to bring
about a chasm between the two groups, the scientists and the general public.
As a final reference we may quote the following news item:
A deep conflict between science and religion was taken for
granted by many people during the nineteenth century. Recently
belief that the two really complement each other has gained
ground even among scientists. Dr. Linus C. Pauling, Nobel
Prize winner and nuclear physicist, however, refuses to go along.
Interviewed on the television program "Youth Wants to Know"
· Pauling reasserted the skeptical tradition of a Thomas Huxley.
He said: "I have great faith in man's intellect and I have felt
that man should try to solve all problems by understanding and
investigation .. and should not take matters on faith." (34)
Coming from a Nobel Prize winner a sentence that begins with
"I have great faith" and ends with the recommendation that one
"should not take matters on faith," is striking evidence that outside of his field the scientist is very much like the rest of men.
Each one of the names mentioned above ranks high in the scientific world; I have not quoted any second raters. We applaud their
scientific achievements, but we, that is to say the general public,
will not adopt their philosophic scientism.
THE INDIVIDUAL VERSUS HUMANITY

H. J. Muller's dream of progress for the human race--! use the
word dream deliberately-extends forward into a thousand gener-
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ations. Not you and I, here and now, are important; only the human race matters.
And that opens up a touchy topic. In the Nazi and Soviet ideologies, too, the individual is quite unimportant, it is only the state
that counts. We know very well, of course, that our scientists today
have no sympathy whatever with state absolutism; quite definitely
the contrary. May we not suspect, however, that many of them
have a fundamental attitude toward life which, if followed through
logically, will tend in the direction of these state systems. An individual who is a slave to an abstraction called humanity is, as an
individual, little better off than one who is a slave to the state.
(35, p. 109)
The words of James B. Conant are pertinent here:
Naziism triumphed in Germany not because the Germans
were lacking in power to advance learning but because bad
poetry and a wrong philosophy prevailed (36).
The Germans were preeminent in science and, as we are learning
recently, so are the Soviets. In both cases, however, their value
judgments, based as they are on a materialistic philosophy, are not
only unsound but definitely dangerous.'
To the point here are the remarks of Bertalanffy who was quoted
in the introduction to this paper. In his criticism of scientism he
writes:
If human behavior and history are only a product of biological
factors, one of the most important factors must be heredity.
What really matters, then, is not the individual or the culture
but the hereditary substratum of the nation or race, and this
quite logically leads to the notion of a master race and eventually
to the justification of extinguishing others .. In other words, what
really matters is not the individual but the supraindividual whole
of the state, nation or race. Then the human individual becomes
an expendable short-lived cell in the all-important whole .. (Of
course) refusing biologism does not mean that we can neglect
biology as the most important groundwork of behavioral science
(8).
In the text of the "Appeal by Noted Scientists for the Abolition
of War" given out in London on July 9, 1955, signed by nine
scientists, we find this wording:
To call for a way of thinking which shall make such avoidance of war possible is the purpose of this statement . . ·consider
yourselves only as members of a biological species which has had
a remarkable history, and whose disappearance none of us can
desire. ( 3 7) (Italics mine)
This statement is unacceptable to the average layman who looks
upon man not primarily as a member of a "biological species," but
as something unique-a human being.

https://scholarworks.uni.edu/pias/vol63/iss1/8

14

Hauber: Invited Address: Scientists and the Public
92

IOWA ACADEMY OF SCIENCE

[Vol. 63

In contrast to such statements we may meditate on the words
of President Eisenhower with whom the common man is in accord
when he refers to:
The wide gulf between the concept of man made in the image
of his God, and of man as a mere instrument of the state (38).
If we replace the phrase "mere instrument of the state" by "a
product of blind evolutionary forces" we have an "orthodox" dogma
of many modern biologists.
To quote the President again:
Either man is the creature whom the psalmist described as
"a little lower than the angels," crowned with glory and honor,
holding "dominion over the works" of his Creator-or a man is
a soulless, animated machine to be enslaved, used and consumed
by the state for its own glorification. It is therefore a struggle
which goes to the roots of the human spirit, and its shadow falls
across the long sweep of human destiny. (39)
THE TREND AwAY FROM MATERIALISM

As stated in the news item about Pauling, there is today among
scientists a move toward reconciliation of science and religion.
However, it will require a generation or two to bring about a changed attitude; traditions die hard among scientists as well as among
theologians.
Edmund Sinnott's recent Biology of the Spirit (40) is a conspicuuos attempt on the part of an outstanding biologist to break away
from the superstitious fears of anything purposeful in nature. While
there is still a touch of scientism in his reasoning, in that he attempts
to derive man's higher nature from the properties of elementary
protoplasm, he has definitely succeeded in "ridding himself of the
shackling illusions" of a materialistic philosophy. He flatly asserts
that "we face problems so profound that final answers to them lie
beyond the competency of science;" and that man's spirit may be
"regarded as similar in nature to a far greater Spirit."
He admits that, for the time being, his book will give him the
reputation of being "unorthodox" in the minds of other biologists.
However, it is significant to find in a review of Sinnott's book the
claim of another biologist that he is "even more unorthodox than
Mr. Sinnott" ( 41) . Marston Bates, the reviewer, objects to Sinnott's apparent implication that the science of biology should be able
to explain man's spiritual nature. The reviewer, evidently not an
advocate of scientism, claims he is more unorthordox than Sinnott;
Bates looks upon man "as more than an aggregation of purposeful
protoplasm."
There are, I am convinced, many other scientists who think
much as Sinnott does, but hesitate to speak out because of fear of
criticism. If his example encourages them to become insistently

Published by UNI ScholarWorks, 1956

15

Proceedings of the Iowa Academy of Science, Vol. 63 [1956], No. 1, Art. 8
1956]

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

93

vocal the whole picture of scientific materialism may quickly change.
There have appeared from time to time a few other books-not
many--by scientists who emphasize the importance of looking beyond science for an ultimate answer to the mysteries of the universe. Notably among these is The Great Design· ( 42), the introduction to which is by Sir Arthur Thomsen, who was quoted above.
He writes:
Science is not the only kind of knowledge, it is not the only
pathway towards truth, but it is indispensable .. What science
seems to show is that we cannot "make sense" of the universe
and our place in it unless we believe in the reality of Purposeof Divine Design that has counted throughout the past and will
continue to count in the future.
This is essentially the thesis of Sinnott's book.
Another book worth rereading in these times is Michael Pupin's
The New Reformation (43). As far back as 1928 he stated:
If the signs of the times do not deceive then there is a universal drift toward this mental attitude-that God's spiritual realities are illustrated and made intelligible by the physical things
that are made. (pp. 272-3)
This is a return to the viewpoint of the Bible, and to the viewpoint of scientists generally before the middle of the nineteenth
century.
William Agar (35) discusses the causes that led to our modern
materialistic philosophy of nature and of man. Among these causes
are:
a) The success of scientific methods which "brought results; it
gave material comforts, enormous power .. and a control over nature that had never before been considered possible," and
b) The simplicity of the mechanistic view as contrasted with Cartesian dualism.
Having said this he makes it plain that today the very success of
science threatens to break this strangle-hold of materialistic thinking. In place of the material comforts provided by the gadgets of
science we arc now facing the terrors of an H-bomb; and there is
nothing at all simple any more in the recent mathematical theories
of the nature of the universe as analyzed by modern physicists.
In this whole matter of materialism in science one may well agree
with Ehrenfest:
To believe that one can make physical theories without metaphysics and without unobservable quantities, that is one of the
diseases of childhood. (44)
The Conferences on Religion in the Age of Science held in 1954
and 1955 at Star Island, N. H., as reported by Ralph W. Burhoe
( 20, 21) are encouraging signs of the times. When a group meets in
which one speaker can say: "A religion that accepts the philosophy
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of materialism is no religion at all" (20, p. 522), and another
speaker insists that "Any alleged knowledge about an actuality
transcending the temporal world is mistaken" (21, p. 1278), the
stage is set for a discussion that will make everybody think.
Personally I do not agree with a definition of religion that is to be
formulated in "terms of a problem to be answered: what is the
sphere of most concern to man?" Nor do I like the conclusion that
the problem of what is of most concern to man "is at once a
question of fact and of value, and value thus becomes a special
cla.ss of fact." The point, however, is not that we disagree, but that
we discuss our disagreements.
It it is true that
Many came away with a deeper understanding of what Pope
Pius XII may have meant when he said to the Pontifical Academy of Science 22 Nov. 1951: "In fact, according to the measure
of its progress, and contrary to affirmations advanced in the past,
true science discovers God in ever-increasing degree-as though
God were waiting behind every door opened by science.," (20)
then something worth while has been accomplished.
We may close this part of our discussion with a quotation from
Joel H. Hilderbrand ( 55, p. 455) :
We of the free world will not be saved by science alone, but
we will not be saved without science. We will need our every
resource of knowledge and intelligence in order to remain free.
THE SPIRITUAL ASPECTS OF HUMAN NATURE

It is clear that in discussing the nature of man one must consult
the findings of modern biologists; but one must also draw on other
sources for information. In this discussion, therefore, I am not
speaking primarily as a biologist, but simply as a human being. One
of my objectives is to show that the traditional philosophy concerning human nature is not negated by modern science, but rather
clarified and illuminated by it.
Throughout the history of western thought, from the Greeks to
Darwin, man has been defined as an animal rationale, a brute
that thinks. This definition is surely still sound. But mod~rn science
has contributed so much to our understanding of the animal part of
the definition that it becomes necessary to modify some of the
older ideas. In the historical development of a concept such as this it
may be desirable to reject some of the ideas of past thinkers in
order to bring the matter up to date; just as in a growing child
the temporary teeth are rather violently removed, although it is
only to make room for another set better adapted to mature life;
continuity is not lost.
When now we discuss the rationale part of the definition it is
well to be on our guard against the concept that, because man is
both animal and rational, he therefore has two natures. Human
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nature is one nature that performs the activities of a subhuman
animal plus something more. It is only since the time of Descartes
(+1650) that the definition animal rationale has come to imply that
there are two opposed natures in man, the one animal, the other
spiritual. In traditional Christian thought there is no such thing as
"saving one's soul" without saving the body. The Apostles' Creed
calls for a resurrection of the body, a glorified body, indeed, but
something material. It is modern philosophy that has brought an
excessive dualism into man's makeup.
Yet, the fact that man .who is a physical part of the universe is
able to analyze that same universe has always seemed a mystery
to anyone who thinks deeply enough. Unfortunately, in a modern
scientist's vocabulary the word mystery is taboo. However, to me,
and to all men, this world is full of wonders, and wonders are
mysteries. Some biologists like to deny all spiritual reality because
it is "mysterious", but as likely as not they go on their knees to
worship the physical basis of that reality, be it genes or frontal
lobes or whatever their specialty happens to be. They like to talk
and write about the marvels and exciting phenomena of the world
about them, but the faculty which is able to marvel and get excited
is not within their realm of thinking; it cannot become the object
of research because it has no material earmarks on which one can
experiment.
If the above paragraph radiates a bit of sarcasm, that is simply
a reaction to similar outbursts that come from the materialists. In
any case the heat of irritation generated when opposite ideologies
rub each other may produce a spark of light. It is friction that
lights the match.
Recent biology texts have a preference for a subtitle such as: Its
Human Implications (45; the Human AjJproach (46); Man and
the Living World (4 7) . A careful search, however, through the contents of the book reveals nothing there on man as man. His animal
nature and its evolution is stressed, his economic dependence on
plants and animals is featured, but there is little hint that man is
more than a biological entity. One gets the impression that he is but
a speck in an astronomical universe, which is indeed true; but
never a suggestion that there is another fact which is equally true,
namely that in the realm of values man is more important than
any astronomical universe, that the inorganic world has no value
at all except in the mind of an intelligent being. Of course, authors
of biology texts must treat primarily man's physical nature; but
modern departmentalization of subject .matter is a poor excuse for
giving students a wrong impression by the silent treatment. Fear
of referring to anything spiritual has become something of a sup,erstition with too many scientists.
A similar criticism applies to the public utterances of represent-
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ative scientists. The presidential address of E. D. Adrian, already
referred to (2), is entitled: Science and Human Nature. It is an
intensely interesting and thought-provoking allocution, but as far
as any reference to any spiritual faculties is concerned there is
only one sentence that is pertinent: " We must look. beyond physiology for an adequate picture of the human brain in action."
Personally I receive with gratitude and even with enthusiasm all
the findings about man that modern science has given us: his origin
during the Ice Age from some prehuman ancestor, his automatic
bodily machinery, in a word all the facts about his animal nature.
But I do not for that reason reject. the old philosophy that ascribes
to him spiritual powers as well as animal characteristics; the life of
the spirit is, as I see it, something fundamentally and radically different from purely animal activities. I do not understand how the
two faculties are combined in one creature-no one does-but to
me the fact is there.
This matter of insisting that man possesses something essentially
superior to anything found in brute creation is so fundamental, and
at the same time so objectionable to many scientists, that a somewhat detailed discussion seems justified.
ANIMAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE HUMAN INTELLECT

As used in the English language the word intellect is something
quite different from the word intelligence. We speak, and rightly
so, of intelligent animals because by experience they automatically
condition their reflexes so as to meet the requirements of something
new in their environment. To a large extent human intelligence
operates in the same way, though human acts are never purely
animal in nature; man knows what he is doing and he tries to
understand why he does it; he can analyze his own conditioned
reflexes and deliberately improve on them.
When purely animal behavior is analyzed four "psychic" powers
may be recognized :
1. Higher animals "perceive" material objects by means of the
senses. In some way, replicas of material things and representations
of their qualities, are impressed on the nervous system of the animal.
W'e call these impressions, whatever they are, sense images.
2. These images persist in latent form and they may, on appropriate stimulation, be "recalled." This is sense memory.
3. Sense images may be combined or modified, and this manipulation and recombination of the images is imagination, the formation of images within the or,ganism.
4. Old images may be superimposed on new ones as these an;
supplied by the senses in such a way as to apply the lessons of pre~
vious experience to the solution of present problems. This is the
vis aestimativa of Aquinas, which may be translated "practic~i
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reason." Animals thus ·solve material problems without the intervention of any true reasoning process, although the end result definitely mimics abstract human reason.
A hungry ape confronted by the classical banana-on-the-ceiling
problem forms a series of images; of the banana, of the ceilinO'-tofloor distance, of his own reach (a memory image) , and so0 on.
When these images do not click, he becomes restless because he is
hungry, and looks about. He perceives a pole nearby, the length of
which fits his distance-to-floor image. His constructive imagination,
that is, his practical "reason" puts the two together, and adds a
further image of himself manipulating the stick. The result is the
solution of a material problem on a strictly material level; and,
stimulated by hunger, instinctive action does the rest.
Now man, being an animal, not only possesses all these mental
faculties, but he is constantly using them. However, he also possesses a faculty that is peculiar to man and totally absent in other organisms, namely the intellect. While this the one and only essential
difference between man and subhuman animals, it is because of
the understanding supplied by the intellect that man has the power
of free choice; he .becomes responsible for his acts. In all other
respects man acts like the animal that he is.
Faced with a problem on the strictly material level, such as that
of a hungry ape, man may proceed towards its solution in the same
way as does an intelligent animal. But while doing so he may also,
and he usually does, reflect on what he is doing: What makes me
hungry? Why do I want a banana? Do I have a right to it?
The answers to questions of this type require the power of abstraction. What is an abstraction? As an example we may here appropriately cite the elementary idea of hunger. Hunger in the concrete is
always associated with a material organism; it is a quality of a
material being. An ape or dog can feel hunger, but he cannot separate that feeling of hunger from himself and think of it as such.
He cannot make a judgment: I need food in order to appease my
hunger. He cannot form ideas of qualities such as goodness, health,
beauty, size, apart from the objects that possess these qualities. His
mental images are of material things in the concrete only. He cannot compose a sentence because that requires the bringing together
of qualities apart from the concrete things that possess, these qualities.
We may not understand exactly what the images of an animal
are like, but we may be sure that they are not purely physical
phenomena in the crude sense that an image produced in a camera
is a strictly material thing. A mental image of any kind is immaterial,
and it is precisely for that reason that an ape cannot, like a man,
reflect on what he is doing or thinking. He cannot form new images
of his own images because these are not material objects that can
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be mentally "photographed". An ape cannot control his thinking.
Man, on the other hand, can reflect. To reflect means to bend
back and here it implies the power of bending back one's thoughts
from' the things thought about to the thoughts themselves. This is
quite a different process from that of using the imagination. Immaterial processes, such as thoughts, cannot be imagined because
they have no material earmarks that lend themselves to image formation. The imagination of itself cannot form abstractions, though
it is quite true that in human thinking the imagination must always
accompany the activities of the intellect. The intellect is powerless
in the absence of images from which it can take its abstractions. ·
Man's spiritual faculty cannot function without the help of the
material organism.
It is this intimate connection between the two faculties, imagination and intellect, that has led many thinkers to deny that man has
anything superior to his animal powers. 'Vhenever one tries to analyze human thinking it is the activities of the imagination, not of
the intellect, that stand out and seem to be the whole process.
To develop this important point a bit farther we may consider
briefly the concepts of brain and mind. Are the two one and the
same thing? At the risk of being considered dogmatic, I answer
with a categorical No, they are not. The brain belongs to our
material body which can be investigated; the mind is the nonmaterial investigator. It is true, of course, that without the nervous
activity of the brain there can be no human thinking. Indeed there
is reason to believe that if one could follow all that goes on in the
human brain while a man is thinking, his thoughts could be interpreted from these brain activities. But the movements of matter
in the brain are not the thoughts any more than the printed page
is the thought of the author. Even if one could observe the minutest
details of brain activity it would still require a mind, not just another brain, to recognize what thoughts are there represented. In
this connection it is worth while to repeat for the sake of emphasis
the words of E. D. Adrian already quoted: "Wc must look beyond
physiology for an adequate picture of the human brain in action."
PRIMITIVE MAN

During the past year Raymond A. Dart of the University of
Witwatersrand, South Africa, the discoverer of Australopithecus,
reported finding the teeth of this creature in a deposit together with
crudely chipped stone tools of the "Pebble Culture." (50) No one
as far as I know, has called this southern man-like ape a man,
though in brain capacity it is nearer to man than any recent apes.
If future research confirms this association of tools with an anthropoid, as it may, science will have helped to clear our ideas of just
what is the difference between strictly human activities and those
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that men have in common with subhuman animals. Apparently
the making and use of tools is within the range of subhuman intelligence, inasmuch as it deals with the solution of practical problems.
Such problems are habitually solved by animals with the help. only
of the senses, memory and the imagination, though of course, the
process is guided, or shall we say dominated, by instinctive drives.
The intelligence needed for making tools is not essentially different
from that needed by a robin to build a nest.
Let's consider a bird's nest-building routine. It is a series of consecutive procedures that lead toward a goal, and it therefore presupposes something that is at least the equivalent of human reasoning, though as a matter of fact it is much more. But the bird itself
does not reason, it doesn't think at all about what it is doing. A
robin is essentially a machine, a secondary cause of a whole series
of automatic events. The reasoning, or the necessary equivalent,
was done long before there were robins by the Creator of the universe. The Creator, however, did not design individual robins as
a man might design a type of automatic machine. For ages other
secondary causes had been at work, particularly those included
under the name of evolution, to "create" the species known to us
as the robin. By means of such a super-complicated series of secondary causes the robin was furnished its nervous system, its endocrines, its instincts, all of which operate in obedience to the "plan"
in the mind of the original Primary Cause of the robin, the Creator
of the universe as a whole.
Now it is quite evident that man, in his ordinary physical and
biological activities, in his metabolism, morphogenesis and reflexes,
acts like any other animal, that is, mechanically and automatically.
It is only when he investigates the why and wherefore of what he
is doing, something never attempted by the brute creation; that he
has recourse to his spiritual powers, that is, to his intellect.
In other words, the preparation of crude tools may very well be
an instinctive procedure; it is much less complicated than a bird's
nest-building instinct. One can find no good reason why a subhuman animal such as an ape could not chip flints even though
it possessed no more power of reasoning than a robin. In man,
then, the habit would persist until such time as his power of reasoning would replace, or at least improve, what had been inherited
from prehuman ancestors as routine activity.
AnouT EXTRASENSORY PERCEPTION

Before taking up a discussion of the areas of contact between
science and religion we may comment briefly on the alleged phenomena of extrasensory perception. The recent controversy on
ESP ( 48,49) reveals, as I see it, a mistaken concept in the minds
of some scientists of what should be called supernatural. Su per
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means above and outside of; in connection with natural it can
refer only to the Author of nature. Since a materialistic philosophy dispenses with this Author, anything supernatural becomes a
priori impossible! Hence the rather violent condemnation of ESP
since it seems to suggest the need of a supernatural explanation.
But no ·matter what our attitude toward the supernatural, it
seems clear to me at least, that these investigations are strictly
in the natural order; the supernatural is not subject to investigation by any conceivable set of experiments. Its acceptance depends, in part at least, on value judgments; it is indeed inferred
from facts of the natural order, but it is not one of the facts.
It is not necessary to decide at this time whether the conclusions
reached by the ESP proponents are valid. The whole matter seems
to depend on the reliability of probability mathematics, and I
agree with the statement of Bridgman that "the situation covered
by the word probability is a desperately complex situation." (49,
p. 17) What is needed is to establish the facts beyond reasonable
doubt. Whether there is any explanation in sight for the alleged
facts is not to the point; the scientist accepts facts when satisfactorily demonstrated whether they fit into any theoretical framework or not. When in doubt he simply withholds judgment on
the matter. But, in any case, we may be sure that no experiments
of the ESP defenders will ever "demonstrate" the existence of
supernatural phenomena.
SCIENCE AND RELIGION

It has always been my conviction that science and religion are
mutually helpful, not antagonistic, and it is one of the objectives
of this paper to discuss how this is so. Some of the best scientific
work has been done by men who were strongly religious-Mendel,
Pasteur, Janssens, and so on. The recent obituary of Teilhard de
Chardin ( 51) reminds of the fact that the investigation of prehistoric man has been promoted by a number of famous clergymen,
Obermaier, Breuil, de Chardin and others. If devotion to religious
ideals were opposed to the scientific attitude, as some would have
us think; if the concept of teleology, the purposefulness of events,
were a bar to scientific progress, as Shull says (27), this could
hardly have happened.
ScrnNCE AN

Arn

TO RELIGION

On this topic one might preach a sermon, in line with the ideas
of Sir Arthur Thomsen and Pope Pius XII, on how the wonders
of nature point to an omnipotent, all-wise God; but in view of
the fact that the modern scientific mind is allergic to such ideas,
the temptation to do so must be resisted. However we may be able
to agree on the following statements.
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( 1) Science is destroying superstitions. Such phenomena as the
persecution of witches will, we may hope, not occur again in history.
(2) Science has demonstrated that many phenomena of the
material order, which formerly were interpreted as examples of
God's interference with natural laws, are in reality explicable by
the action of these laws ..In this sense many theologians have been
compelled to give ground, but it is ground that actually never was
theirs. Theologians of the past had the mistaken concepts just as scientists of the past had them. What else can one expect of human
thinking? I am sure that some of my remarks today are quite inaccurate. In a word, the facts uncovered by science are a help
to theologians.
( 3) Before this age of science too many people accepted an
extremely literal interpretation of the first chapters of Genesis6000 years for the age of the earth, the story of a universal deluge,
and so on. Such literal interpretations of Scripture were too often
considered an essential element of religion. Science has now opened the door to a more reasonable understanding of these ancient
documents. A recent book entitled Beginnings ( 52) illustrates how
this is done-not only the natural sciences are drawn upon but
also those dealing with Oriental Antiquity. Scripture scholars can
now clear up difficulties that formerly could not be solved.
( 4) The religious outlook of the Commission of Cardinals that
condemned Galileo was, unfortunately but understandably, tied to
the science of the time; both religion and science insisted on a
geocentric universe, a mistaken concept in the domain of science,
and a narrow one for religious thinkers. When science corrected itself religion was one of its beneficiaries.
( 5) The idea that Almighty God created each and every kind of
plant and animal by a special divine fiat was quite generally accepted by scientists as well as theologians until after the days of
Linnaeus. That nature of itself, as a secondary cause, could "create" so to speak, the innumerable varieties and species of living organisms, seemed unthinkable to most people until science provided the pertinent facts to show that progressive transformism, i.e.,
organic evolution, has occurred. The result has been for theologians a greatly improved concept of how God operates in his
universe. In this matter many theologians, being very human and
conservative, were quite slow to accept the new outlook. By this
time, thanks to the scientists, most of them are convinced.
RELIGION AN Am TO SCIENCE
Science gives men control of natural forces-electric power,
atomic energy, food production, disease prevention. Religion is of
no direct help in achieving these objectives, but indirectly it promotes civilization and a state of law and order in society without
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which scientific progress is impossible.
Moreover, science puts at men's disposal more and more power,
and power can be abused. Writing in 1948 after the second World
War, S. J. Holmes has this to say:
The deliberate mass murder, starvation, torture and fiendish
cruelty inflicted on multitudes which run even into the millions,
could have been carried out only by a people deliberately brutalized in accordance with an ideology which recognizes no moral
obligation except to the state as the embodiment of power. This
striking revelation of the diabolical possibilities of human nature must come as a shock to those accustomed to thinking well
of their kind. And it must be a bit disconcerting to optimists in
general to reflect that, in spite of its great advances, our civilization has just seen some of the darkest pages in history (32, p.

180).
Just where and how the Nazi group obtained their ideology
"which recognizes no moral obligations" Holmes does not say. The
Germans were in the forefront of scientific progress, and this thing
happened. Judging from the context of his book Holmes would be
unlikely to attribute it to the absence of religious training. Quoting
him again:
Catholics insist strongly on bringing up their children in the
faith and instilling their beliefs into them before they can judge
of their truth and falsity. This of course makes for institutional
stability, although by unfair means .. The child should be given
a fair chance to form his own (opinions) without being biassed
in advance (pp. 169, 170).
I am afraid that men like Holmes, Riddle and Carlson have no
realistic understanding of human nature. They should know that
only a small minority of mankind can make its own decisions in
matters of this kind; if forced to do so, the chances are that they
will arrive at decisions worse than any their parents could have
given them. Moreover, bias canm>t be avoided in the training of
children; if they are taught no religion they will be biassed against
it. Civilization makes progress because children are indoctrinated
with the lessons of the past: "no man is an island." The Nazi
group which Holmes finds difficult to understand-which indeed
no one can understand-was a group that had been indoctrinated
from youth with a materialistic ideology. Their leaders were intelligent men, many of them scientists. The words of Montagu are
appropriate here: "An intelligence that is not humane is the most
dangerous thing in the world." (53, p. 111)
This is where religion becomes important. As a matter of fact
I feel that it is fortunate that theologians were slow to yield to
the new ideas of evolutionary science and slow to promulgate them
among an unprepared general public; the early exponents of sci-
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ence tied it to a materialistic philosophy that is a real danger. In
this connection we may quote E. D. Copeland:
A people who break away from the teachings of religion, and
permit their mortality to become as lax as ours has become, is at
a serious, and eventually at a fatal disadvantage in competition
with any people at all equal in other respects, which effectively
maintains its code of conduct, by whatever means (54. p. 208).
It is my conviction that the kind of philosophical evolutionary
thought envisioned by men like Oscar Riddle, if "unleashed" as
he puts it, among the general public, will in the long run make
possible in society further outbreaks of what Holmes calls "The
diabolical possibilities of human nature."
ON FAITH

All men, including the extreme materialists, have faith in something or other. For the man without religious convictions any faith
he has is necessarily blind, that is, it is based on wishful thinking
and sustained by an optimistic temperament. When analyzed, such
faith has no bearing whatever on the future welfare of any individual or group of individuals; it is a sort of statistical average
that does little more than give a comfortable feeling that all is well
with the world.
The faith of many religious people is likewise largely a matter
of vague emotional pressure and wishful thinking. Yet· there is
always a very definite difference; religious faith concerns the welfare of the individual, it inspires to prayer, and one who prays
speaks to a person, not to the shadow of an astronomical universe
or to an abstraction called humanity.
However, genuine religious faith is not primarily a matter of
the emotions, it is not "blind faith." It is based on reason-on a
reasoning process that takes into account all the facts, not merely
those that lie in the domain of natural science. One such fact,
one always assumed by scientists but formally ignored by some of
them, is the existence of orderliness in the universe, the reliability
of the laws of nature. When one argues from laws to a Lawgiver,
to the existence of a Supreme Being, that is a process of reasoning,
not wishful thinking.
To the fact of the existence of God we may add another fact,
namely this: on this earth there is no justice for men. Men of
good will are not rewarded for their activities in behalf of their
fellowmen; they often suffer ·because of their good will. Ort the
other hand, men who prey on their fellowmen, men of ill will,
frequently prosper in this life. This surely is a factual situation.
Putting the two together, the existence of God and the injustices
of this life, one must arrive logically at the conclusion that justice
will be provided in a life to come.
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Such reasoning, of course, does not compel the assent of anyone; it is not a process of demonstration such as the scientist may
insist on having. Still it is a process of logical deduction, not a
matter of one's feelings.
If some hard-boiled scientist, like Fred Hoyle for instance ( 56),
were to ask me today: "Do you really believe in a personal immortality?" I should be inclined to answer something like this:
When I was young I had faith in a hereafter, a spontaneous
faith which at times may have faltered a bit. However, as a biologist I have been compelled to meditate over the years on the
scientific facts that pertain to my human body and I am no longer
so sure that I have that same simple faith.
When I reflect that for more than 70 years a thousand intricate chemical and physical processes have cooperated harmoniously
to keep me alive; when I realize that I have only the most superficial understanding of what has kept my heart beating regularly,
at least once a second, during these years; or how it is that my
liver has kept excess sugar out of my blood stream by storing it
until actually needed; when I consider the fact that my pituitary
has stimulated my adrenal cortex with ACTH all along in just
the right way; when I kn,ow that if these processes, and literally,
a thousand others like them, had not cooperated harmoniously, I
should never have been born, much less have survived through a
long life; when I meditate on these facts, there arise at times
doubts about the reality of even my present existence-the fact
that I am here seems a fantastic impossibility!
But of course the doubt is the doubt of a dream; when I awaken
I know that this impossible reality, my physical survival, is something that cannot be questioned. Yet the passing doubt drives home
a very thought-provoking truth, namely this: if my physical existence, dependent as it is for survival upon such inconceivable
· complexity of structure and function, were not demonstrated, I
could not accept its reality by faith alone!
My actual physical survival is an incredible miracle beside which
the survival of my spirit in an after life is an elementary and simple concept. My faith in a hereafter has been transformed into a
conviction so absolute that I dare no longer call it faith. Faith is
a virtue, while conviction is the equivalent of knowledge.
When one combines scientific facts, such as those of my physical body, with the common sense fact that there is no justice in
this world, then faith is put on a rational basis. Hoyle, the pessimist, says: "It seems to me that religion is but a desperate attempt
to find an escape from the truly dreadful situation in which we
find ourselves (p. 125) ." How anyone who has meditated on the
survival of the human organism in spite of "impossible" physical
and chemical complexities, can still be a pessimist is beyond my
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comprehension. There is something wrong, not only in his thinking processes which are fallible in all of us, but in his entire general attitude toward basic problems. I suppose one should apologize for that indictment, but why do so? A pessimist does not
expect it.

* * * * * *

We may end this paper as it was begun with an appeal to the
scientists that they make every effort to be understood by the lay
public. They have an important message to deliver, but tpey have,
in the main, kept it to themselves. They have at their disposal the
modern means of communication but they are handicapped by the
fact that the scientific experts do not speak the language of the
layman, as Professor Rabi has so forcibly indicated in his Harvard
address. We must find interpreters to do the job of giving adequate and acceptable publicity to the work of the experts.
In line with this all-out effort we must discourage the dissemination, in the name of science, of value judgments that are the
product of men who incline to some form or other of scientism.
Scientists do not have a monopoly on wisdom and they cannot·
attack the deep-seated ideologies of the common man and hope to
retain his confidence. They should not act and speak in a way
that make possible the publication and popularity of a book like
Science Is a Sacred Cow. Science has its limitations, and the value
judgments of the common man, especially of the religious man,
deserve to be respected. Let's insist, not merely admit, that spiritual values are more important than food, raiment and physical
comforts. With all his faults the common man recognizes that
great truth-that spiritual values outweigh the material. And if
scientists in their publicity efforts will state their agreement with
that principle they will have taken a big step toward winning the
confidence of the layman.
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